STILLWATER, Okla. (The Oklahoma Post) January 26, 2026
USA Rare Earth (USAR) does it again. The biggest fraud since Enron in my opine. Fact check on your own. I may be off a tad here or there, like a couple of pieces of pepperoni when you order extra pepperoni on an extra-large Hideaway Pizza. You know and I know, because of the stoner, a few pieces are misplaced. So hear me out.
There’s something deeply American about watching a CEO on CNBC on the segment, Power Lunch, announce that their company, which has never earned a single dollar in revenue and whose own accountants doubt it can survive the next twelve months, has just secured $3.1 billion in funding from taxpayers and “many times oversubscribed” private investors. CNBC’s Brian Sullivan, co-anchor of “Power Lunch” and the network’s Senior National Correspondent, conducted the January 26, 2026 interview. Sullivan asked pointed questions about what differentiates USA Rare Earth from previous failed attempts to develop the Round Top deposit, a question Humpton notably sidestepped with generalities about government support and technological advances. To Sullivan’s credit, he pressed on the timeline issues, though the format didn’t allow for deep exploration of the contradictions between management’s optimistic projections and the company’s SEC disclosures. The interview aired during market hours as the stock surged 20% on the funding announcement. In the end, isn’t this just a show that we didn’t need to invade Greenland at all? Finally, someone got through to Trump, and he went full Socialist. Better than fascist I suppose.
Watch CNBC’s full interview with USA Rare Earth CEO Barbara Humpton
The “De-Risked” Technology Switch Nobody Understood
During the CNBC interview, CEO Barbara Humpton used a term that caught even anchor Brian Sullivan off guard: the company had “de-risked” its technology approach. Sullivan, to his credit, didn’t pretend to understand what that meant and moved on to other questions. Psttt. I have professionally managed the risk she is referring. She means, they can’t do it…the right way. It is like when Clarke buys the car at the beginning of Vacation. The car changes post sale and he just has to, well take it. But for Stillwater taxpayers who invested $10 million in what they thought was a magnet manufacturing facility, “de-risked” turns out to be corporate speak for “we’re changing everything mid-stream.”
Here’s what actually happened. USA Rare Earth spent years promoting its proprietary Continuous Ion Exchange (CIX) technology as the revolutionary process that would make Round Top’s low-grade ore economically viable. The company’s entire pitch centered on this supposedly breakthrough approach. Stillwater’s facility was designed around eventually receiving rare earth materials processed using this CIX technology from Round Top.
Then in December 2025, USA Rare Earth quietly announced it was switching to standard solvent extraction (SX) methods instead. The Wheat Ridge, Colorado facility that was supposed to be validating the commercial-scale CIX process? It’s now called a “demonstration facility” running solvent extraction pilot work. The government funding announcement on January 26, 2026 confirmed this pivot: the Definitive Feasibility Study will be based on solvent extraction results, not the CIX technology they’d been promoting for years.
The problem is that solvent extraction is exactly the technology USA Rare Earth claimed it didn’t need. It’s chemically intensive, environmentally challenging, expensive, and requires massive infrastructure. It’s also the reason rare earth processing has been concentrated in China, where environmental regulations are less stringent and labor costs are lower.
For Stillwater, this technology switch creates profound uncertainty. The 310,000 square foot facility was designed with certain assumptions about feedstock characteristics and processing requirements. If the upstream extraction process fundamentally changes, does the downstream magnet manufacturing process need modification? The company hasn’t addressed this publicly.
This is what “de-risking” means in corporate translation: admitting your proprietary technology probably won’t work at commercial scale, so you’re switching to the same proven methods everyone else uses. This is after they bought a couple foreign owned companies. Catching on? The government bought the risk…because Trumps friend needs his money and property back. Confusing, eh?
The Heavy Rare Earth Pivot
But wait, there’s more. USA Rare Earth also announced a strategic shift in focus from the light rare earths used in most magnets (neodymium and praseodymium) to heavy rare earths like dysprosium and terbium, along with critical minerals including hafnium and zirconium.
The January 26, 2026 government funding announcement specified that Round Top will process “12 rare earth and critical minerals” including yttrium, gallium, dysprosium, terbium, holmium, lutetium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, gadolinium, hafnium, and zirconium. This represents a significant expansion from the original mine-to-magnet pitch that focused primarily on neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB) magnets.
Hafnium and zirconium are indeed in high demand. Hafnium is critical for nuclear reactor control rods and advanced semiconductors. Zirconium is essential for nuclear fuel cladding and specialty alloys. Both command premium prices and have limited domestic supply. This pivot makes strategic sense from a national security perspective, these materials are genuinely critical and largely unavailable outside China.
But here’s what USA Rare Earth hasn’t explained to Stillwater: how does this shift affect the magnet facility? NdFeB magnets require consistent, high-purity neodymium and praseodymium oxides. If Round Top is now optimizing for heavy rare earths and critical minerals like hafnium and zirconium, will there be sufficient light rare earth production to feed the Oklahoma magnet facility? Or will Stillwater’s plant continue sourcing light rare earths from third parties, while Round Top focuses on the more lucrative heavy rare earth and critical minerals market?
The government funding documents mention the facility will “process a combined 8,000 metric tons per annum of third-party mixed rare earth carbonate (MREC) and heavy rare earth elements.” Third-party means imported. The Stillwater facility could end up making “American” magnets with Chinese rare earth materials indefinitely, while Round Top focuses on extracting materials the magnet plant doesn’t primarily need.
The Demonstration Facility Problem
Here’s where semantics matter. USA Rare Earth originally described its Wheat Ridge, Colorado facility as a pilot plant for proving commercial-scale CIX technology. Following the switch to solvent extraction, it’s now called a “demonstration facility” that will run for 2,000 to 4,000 hours through October 2026 to “generate operational data required to proceed with commercial plant design.”
A pilot plant tests whether technology works at intermediate scale before committing to full commercial deployment. A demonstration facility is what you run when you need to prove to investors and government funders that you can actually do what you’ve been claiming you can do. It’s the difference between “we’re ready to scale up” and “we’re still trying to figure this out.”
For perspective, 4,000 hours is about 167 days of continuous operation. Industrial rare earth separation facilities in China run 24/7 for years. Running a process for 167 days and calling it validation is like test-driving a car for two weeks and declaring it suitable for a cross-country trucking operation. Listen, I grew up drinking keg bear in the nearby by woods as a junior high lost boy. The area, was intended to be a nice, middle-class neighborhood surrounded by the greenest of greenbelts Stillwater money could buy. The high-density buildup of even this local area is questionable prima facia.
Meanwhile, down near MEHICO, a Definitive Feasibility Study for Round Top is now split into two phases. Phase One uses the solvent extraction pilot results and is “expected” to be complete by early 2027. Phase Two uses data from the demonstration plant run finishing in October 2026. So the DFS supporting a multi-billion-dollar mining and processing complex won’t be complete until sometime after October 2026, which means actual construction probably won’t start until 2027 at the earliest.
Remember, commercial production is targeted for late 2028. That’s less than three years from DFS completion to operating mine. For context, MP Materials’ Mountain Pass mine, which was reopening an existing facility with known geology and proven processing technology, took longer than that. USA Rare Earth is proposing to complete a feasibility study, secure financing, obtain permits, construct a mine, build processing facilities, validate a separation process, and begin commercial production of materials they’ve never produced before, all in under three years.
The company describes this as an “Accelerated Mine Plan.” A more accurate description might be “wildly optimistic timeline designed to satisfy government funding milestone requirements.” As an example, I believe Mexico’s national mines bring in a Billion annually. It is cheaper to process accelerated elsewhere and then ship back into the ME HE CO. Trading with a friendly market.
The Leaching Question: What Stillwater Isn’t Being Told
When USA Rare Earth describes its “mine-to-magnet” supply chain, the company glosses over a critical detail: where exactly does the environmentally intensive leaching process happen, and what are the risks?
The answer matters enormously for Stillwater. According to USA Rare Earth’s own descriptions, the Round Top mine in Sierra Blanca, Texas will use heap leaching to extract rare earth elements from crushed ore.1 This involves creating massive piles of crushed rock on lined surfaces, then soaking the material with sulfuric acid or other leaching agents to dissolve the valuable minerals.2 The resulting acidic leachate drains into collection systems for processing.
Heap leaching is standard practice in mining, but it comes with well-documented environmental risks. The leaching and precipitation processes require large amounts of chemicals including hydrochloric acid (HCl), sulfuric acid (H₂SO₄), and sodium hydroxide (NaOH), and their production is associated with considerable environmental pollution.3 For every ton of rare earth produced, the mining process typically yields 13 kilograms of dust, 9,600 to 12,000 cubic meters of waste gas, 75 cubic meters of wastewater, and one ton of radioactive residue.4
The radioactive element concern is particularly relevant for Round Top. Rare earth ores are often laced with radioactive thorium and uranium, which when mixed with leaching pond chemicals, can contaminate air, water, and soil.5 The activity of leaching sludge and acidic process slag is typically much higher than that of raw ores.6 While Round Top’s deposit is described as having lower radioactive content than some rare earth deposits, any presence of thorium and uranium creates risks for groundwater contamination if leaching operations are not properly managed.
Texas environmental regulations will govern the Round Top operation, and USA Rare Earth has stated it will obtain necessary air, water, and waste permits. Initial site surveys have shown “no indications of environmental concerns,” according to company statements.7 However, rare earth leaching operations globally have a troubling track record. Acid mine drainage can produce acidic runoff that devastates aquatic bodies and groundwater, with contamination levels reaching up to 120 mg/L of heavy metals in rivers near mining sites.8 Toxic substances including thorium, uranium, cadmium, and lead can leach into agricultural soils, reducing fertility and threatening food security.9 Considering how the Texas RR Commission operates it’s plugged well program, I cannot imagine any Texas agency succeeding without generous private support.
For Stillwater specifically, the good news is that the Oklahoma facility is designed solely for magnet manufacturing, not rare earth extraction or leaching. The Stillwater plant receives already-processed rare earth oxides, either from Round Top once it begins production or from third-party suppliers.10 The company plans to truck approximately 4,000 tons per year of rare earth oxide from Texas to Oklahoma.11 This means Stillwater avoids the most environmentally intensive aspects of rare earth processing, the chemical leaching, separation, and waste management.
However, magnet manufacturing itself is not without environmental considerations. The sintering process used to create neodymium-iron-boron magnets involves high-temperature furnaces, precision machining that generates metal dust and waste (called swarf), and chemical treatments. The company has indicated it will process 2,000 tons per year of swarf from its magnet production.12 Proper ventilation, dust collection, wastewater treatment, and waste disposal systems are essential for protecting both workers and the surrounding community.
What Stillwater taxpayers should understand is that while their city avoids hosting the most hazardous part of rare earth processing, the facility’s viability depends entirely on Round Top successfully managing those environmental challenges 900 miles away in Texas. If Round Top encounters permitting issues, water contamination problems, or community opposition related to leaching operations, as has occurred with rare earth projects globally, the Stillwater facility loses its domestic feedstock and reverts to importing materials from overseas sources.
The company has been notably quiet about specific environmental safeguards planned for Round Top beyond stating that “Texas has good environmental laws” and that the operation “will be environmentally safe.”13 For a project involving heap leaching of low-grade ore containing radioactive elements, that level of detail is insufficient for communities to assess actual risk.
During the CNBC interview, CEO Humpton did not address environmental compliance, leaching methodology, or waste management plans. These topics rarely make it into investor presentations or government funding announcements, even though they represent material risks to project execution. It’s considerably easier to secure $1.6 billion in government funding than to operate a heap leach mine for decades without environmental incidents. My guess is that the company has never had an EHS plan that considers the process’ or proper permitting.
Stillwater’s $10 million investment depends on Round Top not becoming another cautionary tale of rare earth environmental damage. The city deserves more detailed disclosure about how USA Rare Earth will prevent the leaching operations in Texas from joining the long list of rare earth projects that promised environmental safety and delivered contamination instead.
We can talk about the road damage later….Seriously a new highway will need to be built. The billionaires need to assist with at least an intersection.
What This Means for Stillwater
For Stillwater taxpayers, these pivots create significant additional risk that wasn’t disclosed when the city committed. The original pitch was straightforward: USA Rare Earth would build a magnet manufacturing facility that would eventually use rare earth materials from their Texas mine, creating a fully domestic supply chain. Stillwater’s facility would be the final step in a mine-to-magnet vertical integration that would supply critical magnets for defense, electric vehicles, and renewable energy.
The current reality is considerably more complex. The “real” facility is still under construction, and the current operations supposedly take place in a worn-out old building owned by numerous ventures. We write about the lackluster facility in previous articles. Somewhere a document say’s, the current facilities are now in “commissioning phase” for Q1 2026 after five years of delayed timelines. The extraction technology the mine will eventually use has fundamentally changed from proprietary CIX to standard solvent extraction. The mine’s focus has shifted toward heavy rare earths and critical minerals that aren’t the primary feedstock for the magnets Stillwater’s facility will produce. The timeline for mine operation has extended to late 2028, meaning Stillwater’s facility will be sourcing materials from third parties (read: importing from China) for at least two years after it begins production, if it begins production on schedule.
None of this makes USA Rare Earth’s venture impossible to succeed. Technology pivots happen in development-stage companies. Timeline extensions are common in mining projects. Strategic shifts toward more valuable products make business sense. But each change compounds the risk, and Stillwater committed taxpayer dollars based on the original pitch, not the current evolving reality.
The “de-risking” CEO Humpton referenced on CNBC actually describes transferring technical risk from the company to proven industry-standard processes. But it doesn’t eliminate the execution risk, the timeline risk, the financing risk, or the market risk. It certainly doesn’t eliminate Stillwater’s financial exposure.
The Breakthrough That Wasn’t
Setting aside the technology pivot, let’s examine CEO Humpton’s CNBC claims about “breakthrough” extraction capabilities. This is where things get genuinely interesting if you’re the kind of person who enjoys watching magic tricks and then learning how they work.
Humpton referenced switching from continuous ion exchange to solvent extraction. Wait. What? The company spent years promoting its proprietary CIX technology as the solution that makes Round Top economically viable, and now the CEO is casually mentioning they’re using solvent extraction? That’s like a restaurant spending five years promoting their secret sauce and then mentioning they switched to Heinz.
Solvent extraction is the standard rare earth separation technology used globally. It’s proven, scalable, and well understood. It’s also expensive, complicated, and generates significant waste streams requiring environmental management. There’s nothing breakthrough about it.
The “breakthrough” appears to be that USA Rare Earth has figured out they should use the same technology everyone else uses instead of trying to scale technology that hasn’t been proven at commercial scale. This is like announcing a breakthrough in aviation by revealing you’ve decided to use jet engines instead of trying to power your plane with hamsters on treadmills.
The Wheat Ridge demonstration plant using CIX is still running its 2,000 to 4,000 hours of testing through October 2026. If that testing validates the process, presumably the company will announce another breakthrough by revealing they’re sticking with solvent extraction anyway because it’s what works.
The Live Auction
This is where the deal turns from industrial policy into performance art. The money everyone is cheering for does not actually arrive unless the government becomes the customer. The cash is not a gift. It is a conditional illusion. No magnets bought, no mine producing, no product delivered means no real money changing hands. Until then, what exists is paper, press releases, and a stock chart reacting to vibes. The newly purchased companies. that may, might, possibly contribute are located overseas for the most part, and those companies were kept afloat by even more financial giveaways in Europe.
So when Trump announces billions flowing to “revive American manufacturing,” what he is really doing is promising future checks to a British casting company, contingent on a unproven company proving it can sell something to the very government propping it up. That is the government standing in the checkout line, holding the receipt, and congratulating itself before the register opens. That is not capitalism.
In plain English: this company does not get paid unless Washington becomes its best customer. So we ask, how many Washington insiders got their palms rubbed?
The company has never been paid, despite, USAR claims of having customers. And if Washington does not buy the product, the funding quietly evaporates while the equity dilution remains. Heads the company wins. Tails the taxpayer holds stock in a business that never learned how to sell. Remember, over 200 million was just…given.
That may be industrial strategy. It may be political theater. But free money is not a good thing, and it is certainly not proof the business works. The dollar is crashing. Did we mention that?
On January 26, 2026, USA Rare Earth CEO Barbara Humpton told America to share the thrilling news that her company had received a Letter of Intent for $1.6 billion in government funding, plus another $1.5 billion from private investors. The stock, naturally, jumped 20%. Champagne corks popped somewhere in Colorado, or the Mexican border, or Europe, or on a Yacht Offshore, or Stillwater, Oklahoma: where the company’s 310,000 square foot magnet facility sits in various states of “almost ready” after five years of “production beginning next quarter” promises. Did Mayor Will Joyce’s vacation plans just get better or what?
What CNBC viewers didn’t hear during that interview was equally fascinating. They didn’t hear about the going concern warnings in the company’s SEC filings. They didn’t hear that the Stillwater facility was supposed to start production in late 2021, then mid-2022, then 2023, then 2024, and now maybe, possibly, hopefully in the first half of 2026. They didn’t hear that the Round Top mine in Texas, which supposedly holds all those precious rare earth elements, has ore grades so low that calling it a “resource” is generous enough to qualify as charity work. There are original stakeholders that need compensation.
But let’s start with what CEO Humpton did say on CNBC, because the gap between her confident pronouncements and the documented reality is wide enough to drive a semi-truck full of neodymium through it.
The CNBC Performance
Barbara Humpton, the Joker, came to CNBC’s cameras with the kind of conviction that only comes from years of practice or a profound disconnection from one’s own financial statements. She announced that USA Rare Earth had secured a Letter of Intent with the U.S. government for access to $1.6 billion in funding. This breaks down as $277 million in what she called “federal funding” and $1.3 billion in loans.
What she didn’t mention is that the “$277 million” isn’t actually cash the government is handing over. It’s an equity swap where the government receives 16.1 million shares of stock at $17.17 per share, plus 17.6 million warrants. The shares were issued at a 25% discount to the prior Friday’s closing price. And here’s the truly remarkable part buried in the SEC filing: “the government will retain 100% of such equity securities whether or not the Expected U.S. Government Transaction is funded in full or at all.” Translation: taxpayers take the dilution risk whether the money shows up or not. The President’s piggy bank is where?
The $1.3 billion loan comes with strings attached. Real strings, not the decorative kind. The company must complete a feasibility study by 2027, construct the Round Top mine, and commission production facilities through 2028. Miss those milestones by more than two years and the government can claw everything back. Given that USA Rare Earth has never hit a production timeline in its corporate history, betting on them to nail a multi-year construction schedule is like betting on a racehorse that’s never actually finished a race.
Humpton also trumpeted the $1.5 billion PIPE (Private Investment in Public Equity) that was “many times oversubscribed” from an original $500 million target. She made it sound like investors were trampling each other to get a piece of this opportunity. What she didn’t mention is that the PIPE’s anchor investor is Inflection Point, the same SPAC that took USA Rare Earth public in the first place. The chairman of Inflection Point? Michael Blitzer, who also happens to be the chairman of USA Rare Earth. He sold $32.95 million worth of company stock in August 2025 at $15.75 per share. The January 2026 PIPE priced at $21.50, a tidy 36% higher than Blitzer’s summer sales price.
It’s the kind of interconnected financial arrangement that makes you wonder if “many times oversubscribed” might be a creative way of describing “we asked ourselves for money and we said yes.”
Oh, and the placement agent for the PIPE? Cantor Fitzgerald, whose chairman is Brandon Lutnick, son of Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, who just happened to announce the government funding package. No impropriety has been alleged, but the optics are exactly what you’d expect from a deal involving rare earth elements: dense, complex, and requiring expert analysis to fully understand what you’re looking at. POMPAEEEOOOO. Mustarrrddd.
What the Financial Statements Say
While CEO Humpton was painting visions of American rare earth dominance on CNBC, USA Rare Earth’s Q3 2025 10-Q filing was telling a different story. It’s the kind of story that starts with “substantial doubt” and ends with auditors changing faster than production timelines.
The filing contains this cheerful disclosure: management has “substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern for the twelve months following the issuance of our quarter 2025 condensed consolidated financial statements.” This is accounting speak for “we’re not sure we’ll survive the year.” It’s the financial equivalent of a pilot announcing turbulence while the oxygen masks are dropping.
The company has generated exactly zero dollars in revenue since inception. Not a little revenue. Not almost revenue. Zero. The Q3 2025 revenue matched analyst estimates precisely: $0.00. Yet somehow, this company that has never sold a single magnet or extracted a single gram of rare earth elements is valued at approximately $3.66 billion. The price-to-sales ratio is technically infinite, which is appropriate for a company whose promises seem equally limitless.
Year-to-date losses through September 30, 2025 totaled $248 million. Now, $216.8 million of that is non-cash fair value adjustments on warrant and earnout liabilities, which is Wall Street’s way of saying “we made bets that didn’t work out but we haven’t actually paid for them yet.” Strip out the non-cash charges and you still have $31.2 million in operating losses for nine months. That’s about $3.5 million a month disappearing into the fascinating void between “almost ready to produce” and “actually producing.”
Cash on hand was $257.6 million as of September 30, 2025, improving to over $400 million by November following warrant exercises. Monthly cash burn runs $7-8 million in operating activities, not counting the accelerating capital expenditures for facility construction. At this rate, even with the warrant exercises, the company was looking at maybe 50 months of runway before needing more capital. Hence the $3.1 billion capital raise that Humpton announced with such confidence.
The balance sheet shows stockholders’ equity of negative $58.6 million. That’s right: negative. The company owes more than it owns. Combined warrant and earnout liabilities total $343.9 million, creating the kind of balance sheet volatility that would make a cryptocurrency trader nervous.
USA Rare Earth also changed auditors twice in 2025, going from UHY to HORNE to BDO. Changing auditors once might be preference. Changing twice in a year suggests the accountants keep reading the books and deciding they’d rather be somewhere else.
The Timeline of Tomorrow
One of the great joys of following USA Rare Earth is watching production timelines evolve like a teenager’s explanation of why homework isn’t finished. It’s always almost done, just needs a little more time, definitely happening soon, probably by next quarter unless something comes up.
The Stillwater, Oklahoma magnet facility has been “almost ready” since 2021. Let’s review the production promises:
In 2021, CEO Althaus promised production by “late 2021.” When late 2021 arrived without production, the target moved to “mid-2022.” When mid-2022 came and went, 2023 became the year. By 2023, 2024 looked more realistic. As 2024 wound down, the company started talking about commissioning in Q1 2026 with commercial production in the first half of 2026.
We’re now in Q1 2026, and the facility is described as being in “commissioning phase.” For those keeping score, that’s five years of “next quarter” promises. The company purchased manufacturing equipment from Hitachi Metals in 2020 that had been sitting unused since 2015. Industry critics have questioned whether the equipment even has the necessary operating software and whether USA Rare Earth has proper licensing for sintered NdFeB magnet manufacturing.
The Round Top mine timeline is equally impressive. The project received its first Preliminary Economic Assessment in 2013. An updated PEA came in 2019. No actual mining has commenced. In 2021, then-CEO Althaus projected mining would begin in 2023. By 2024, the start date had slipped to 2025. As of January 2026, commercial production is now targeted for late 2028, which the company described in December 2025 as being “two years earlier than previously anticipated.” Apparently the previous target was 2030, which means the timeline has only expanded by seven years since the 2021 promise of 2023 production.
Here’s the part that CEO Humpton didn’t emphasize on CNBC: even if the Stillwater facility begins magnet production in 2026 as promised, and even if Round Top mining starts in late 2028 as promised, there’s a two-year gap where USA Rare Earth will be making “American” magnets using foreign rare earth materials. The entire pitch about a sovereign supply chain from “mine to magnet” breaks down when your magnets are being made with Chinese rare earth oxides until your mine gets around to producing something.
It’s like opening a restaurant called “Farm to Table” but buying everything from Sysco for the first two years while your farm is still being planted.
The Round Top Reality
Let’s talk about Round Top, because this is where the story gets genuinely fascinating in the way that watching someone dig a hole in the wrong place is fascinating.
The Round Top deposit in West Texas contains rare earth elements. This is true. What’s also true is that it contains them in concentrations only slightly above what you’d find by randomly scooping dirt from your backyard. The ore grade is 0.03% to 0.06% Total Rare Earth Oxide (TREO). For comparison, that’s about three times the natural abundance in Earth’s crust.
MP Materials, the only operating rare earth mine in North America, works with ore grades of 5.98% TREO. That’s approximately 100 times higher than Round Top. One hundred times. It’s the difference between gold mining and sifting through beach sand hoping to find a gold tooth someone lost in 1987.
Industry experts have been polite but pointed. The August 2025 Night Market Research short report included commentary from mining specialists who stated: “At 0.06% TREO content is not a resource… Ridiculous to even call this a deposit.” The report characterized Round Top as essentially worthless from a commercial mining perspective.
USA Rare Earth claims to have developed breakthrough extraction technology called Continuous Ion Exchange (CIX) that makes these low grades economically viable. They announced in January 2025 that they produced 99.1% purity dysprosium oxide from Round Top ore, verified by a third-party ISO 17025 certified lab.
That sounds impressive until you learn that producing high-purity samples in a laboratory is completely different from extracting millions of tons of material economically. Every major commercial rare earth producer in the world uses solvent extraction, not ion exchange, because ion exchange doesn’t scale. Industry consensus holds that ion exchange is fundamentally limited at commercial volumes.
Notably, USA Rare Earth’s current Definitive Feasibility Study is using solvent extraction pilot work, not the supposedly breakthrough CIX technology. The Wheat Ridge, Colorado demonstration plant running CIX is expected to operate 2,000 to 4,000 continuous hours through October 2026 to “validate the process.” If your breakthrough technology needs validation, perhaps calling it a breakthrough is premature.
The company has filed exactly one patent application for its extraction methods, and it’s still pending. For genuinely novel technology that supposedly solves a problem the entire rare earth industry has struggled with for decades, one pending patent seems thin. The company relies primarily on trade secret protection, which is unusual for technology you’d want to commercialize and license.
The MP Materials Comparison
This might be a good time to revisit what happened when the Pentagon decided to invest in America’s rare earth supply chain by backing MP Materials in July 2025. The Oklahoma Post covered this back in August 2025 in an article titled “While MP Materials Hits Jackpot, USAR Goes Broker Than Uncle Rico.” The comparison remains instructive.
MP Materials received $400 million in convertible preferred equity from the Pentagon plus a $150 million direct loan. More importantly, they got a $110 per kilogram price floor guarantee for neodymium-praseodymium oxide for ten years. With Chinese market prices around $60 per kilogram, this floor effectively subsidizes roughly $50 per kilogram. The government also receives 30% of any upside above $110 per kilogram once facilities are operational.
The Pentagon committed to a ten-year offtake agreement to purchase 100% of magnets from MP’s new facility. One hundred percent. The government guaranteed they would buy everything MP could produce.
USA Rare Earth’s deal includes no price floor and no government offtake agreement. The government’s return depends entirely on stock appreciation. If USA Rare Earth succeeds, taxpayers make money. If it fails, taxpayers own shares in a bankrupt company, which is worth exactly what you’d expect shares in a bankrupt company to be worth.
MP Materials generated $53.6 million in Q3 2025 revenue with positive EBITDA in its magnetics segment. USA Rare Earth generated zero revenue. MP Materials operates an actual mine that produces actual rare earth concentrate. USA Rare Earth has a hole in the ground in Texas that may someday become a mine. MP Materials carries no going concern warning. USA Rare Earth’s accountants express “substantial doubt” about its survival.
The government looked at both companies and decided to structure radically different deals. One got price protection, guaranteed purchases, and milestone-based funding tied to an operating business. The other got equity exposure to a pre-revenue development company with a history of missed timelines and unproven technology.
It’s almost like someone looked at the actual facts and made different risk assessments. Imagine that.
The Stillwater Deal Revisited
For readers who missed The Oklahoma Post’s May 2025 article “Stillwater’s Magnet USAR Facility Deal: Wall Street Wins, Oklahoma Loses,” let’s recap what Stillwater got for its $7 million investment.
The city kicked in $7 million in incentives for a facility that was valued through a SPAC merger with Inflection Point Acquisition Corp II, a Cayman Islands entity. The structure included provisions protecting hedge fund investors like L1 Capital (300,000 shares) and Harraden Circle (700,000 shares) with Forward Purchase Options and Non-Redemption Agreements. These mechanisms guaranteed returns to Wall Street investors regardless of whether the company ever produces anything.
Stillwater’s $7 million represents 3.5% of the city’s $200 million annual budget. The city received only a building lien as protection. No job guarantees. No clawback provisions. No equity participation for taxpayers. If USA Rare Earth fails, Stillwater gets a 310,000 square foot building full of possibly obsolete equipment from Hitachi Metals.
The Quality Jobs Program added another $2.75 million in exposure over ten years. So Stillwater is in for roughly $10 million total, and that’s before calculating the opportunity cost of what else could have been done with that capital.
Mike Pompeo joined as a “Strategic Advisor,” likely compensated via stock options or warrants, though exact terms weren’t disclosed. Former Mayor Will Joyce attacked The Oklahoma Post for raising questions about the deal and refused FOIA requests. Current city officials remain drunk in optimism, which is understandable given that acknowledging they may have made a $10 million mistake would be politically awkward. Did we talk about the new solvent removal stress on the water system? We will.
The Stock Price Tells Its Own Story
USA Rare Earth went public via SPAC merger in March 2025 at $5.56 per share, which proved to be its all-time low. The stock peaked at $43.98 on October 13, 2025, before retreating. As of the January 26, 2026 government deal announcement, shares traded in the $21 to $25 range, jumping 20% on the news.
The 52-week range of $5.56 to $43.98 represents nearly 700% volatility. That’s not a stock price; it’s a seismograph during an earthquake. The market capitalization of approximately $3.66 billion values a company with negative equity, zero revenue, unproven technology, missed timelines, going concern warnings, and no clear path to profitability at levels exceeding many actual profitable industrial companies.
Chairman Michael Blitzer’s August 2025 sale of $32.95 million in stock and warrants occurred months before the government deal was announced. Perhaps he needed the money for personal reasons. Perhaps he was diversifying. Perhaps he read his own company’s financial statements and decided to take some chips off the table while people were still buying. The timing is certainly interesting.
Board members received RSU grants in August 2025 vesting in May 2026. The company announced in its proxy that directors would receive additional equity compensation. Everyone’s getting paid in stock, which is convenient when you don’t have revenue to pay cash compensation.
The Uncomfortable Questions
Let’s be clear about what we know and what we don’t know.
We know USA Rare Earth has never generated revenue. We know the company’s own accountants doubt it can survive the next twelve months. We know production timelines have slipped by five years for the Stillwater facility and seven years for Round Top mining. We know the ore grades at Round Top are approximately 1/100th of operating competitors. We know the breakthrough extraction technology is either unproven or has been quietly replaced with standard industry processes depending on which announcement you read. We know the company has changed auditors twice in one year.
We also know the chairman serves dual roles at both the company and its SPAC sponsor/PIPE anchor investor. We know he sold $33 million in company stock months before the government deal was announced. We know the PIPE placement agent is run by the Commerce Secretary’s son. We know taxpayers are taking dilution risk whether or not the full government funding materializes.
What we don’t know is whether any of this constitutes anything more than aggressive capitalism and optimistic projections that didn’t pan out. No evidence suggests impropriety. The interconnections and timing are noteworthy but not necessarily nefarious. Companies miss timelines all the time. Development-stage mining projects often take longer than expected. Breakthrough technologies frequently disappoint. SPACs regularly benefit their sponsors more than their public shareholders.
The question isn’t whether USA Rare Earth is breaking laws. The question is whether taxpayers should be subsidizing this particular bet on America’s rare earth future when the documented facts suggest the odds are longer than CEO Humpton’s CNBC interview implied.
What Happens Next
USA Rare Earth now has to deliver on the milestones tied to its $1.3 billion government loan: feasibility study completion by 2027, Round Top construction, and production facility commissioning through 2028. The company also needs to secure approximately $600 million in additional equity capital beyond the $1.5 billion PIPE. And it needs to establish a $250 million revolving credit facility by December 31, 2026.
That’s a lot of boxes to check for a company whose primary accomplishment to date has been successfully moving production timelines into the future.
The Stillwater facility is supposed to begin commercial magnet production in the first half of 2026. We’re in the first half of 2026 now. If production actually starts, USA Rare Earth will have finally delivered on a promise, and The Oklahoma Post will happily report that fact. If production slips again, well, there’s always the second half of 2026, or maybe 2027, or perhaps 2028 when Round Top is supposed to begin mining.
The Round Top mine needs to complete its Definitive Feasibility Study, secure financing, obtain final permits, construct facilities, and begin commercial production by late 2028. This is a project that has been studied since 2013 and has never moved beyond assessment phase. The odds of hitting a 2028 production target are approximately the same as the odds of finding high-grade rare earth ore in your backyard: technically possible but requiring something close to a miracle.
For Stillwater, the waiting continues. The city’s $10 million investment either becomes a source of jobs and economic activity or becomes a very expensive lesson in the difference between corporate promises and corporate performance. The building isn’t going anywhere. Whether it ever produces magnets remains the $10 million question.
She’s Got an Odd Talent
There’s something quintessentially American about the USA Rare Earth story. A company with no revenue and substantial doubt about its survival convinces the government to invest $1.6 billion, convinces private investors to add $1.5 billion, convinces a small Oklahoma city to kick in $10 million, and convinces public markets to value the whole enterprise at nearly $4 billion. That takes talent. That takes vision. That takes a level of confidence in the face of contradictory evidence that would make a prosperity gospel preacher proud.
CEO Barbara Humpton’s CNBC interview on January 26, 2026, was a masterclass in accentuating the positive. The $3.1 billion in funding sounds impressive. The “many times oversubscribed” PIPE sounds impressive. The “breakthrough” technology sounds impressive. The accelerated timelines sound impressive.
What’s less impressive is the five-year gap between promise and delivery at Stillwater, the seven-year extension of Round Top timelines, the ore grades that industry experts describe as not worth mining, the extraction technology that may or may not work at scale, the going concern warnings, the negative equity, the zero revenue, the auditor musical chairs, and the web of related-party relationships connecting the company chairman to both the SPAC sponsor and the PIPE anchor investor.
The uncomfortable truth is that USA Rare Earth might succeed. Unlikely things happen. Long shots occasionally pay off. Maybe the Stillwater facility will produce magnets. Maybe Round Top will prove viable. Maybe the extraction technology will scale. Maybe the timelines will finally hold. Maybe American rare earth independence is worth the risk.
But when CEO Humpton appears on CNBC radiating confidence about breakthrough technology and government backing, viewers deserve to know what the company’s own SEC filings say about its survival prospects. When she talks about “many times oversubscribed” private investment, viewers deserve to know the anchor investor is chaired by the company’s chairman who sold millions in stock months earlier. When she promises American rare earth production, viewers deserve to know there’s a two-year gap where those “American” magnets will be made with foreign materials.
The gap between Barbara Humpton’s CNBC interview and USA Rare Earth’s documented financial reality is wide enough to fit an entire mine. The question is whether taxpayers and the city of Stillwater are being asked to finance the company’s operations or their CEO’s optimism.
Time will tell. It always does. Usually right after production gets delayed one more quarter.
Writing By: Robbie Robertson | Editing by Robbie Robertson
Sources
Environmental
Elliott (UTEP geologist) quoted in El Paso Matters: “They propose to do a heap leach. Break all the rock up, you’re going to crush it up, they’re going to throw it in a big pile on a lined surface… where they soak it with acid.” https://elpasomatters.org/2024/05/13/round-top-mountain-rare-earth-deposit-sierra-blanca-texas/ ↩
Site Selection Magazine: “The building in Stillwater has a rail spur, but the company will truck the oxide from Texas, amounting to about 4,000 tons a year.” https://siteselection.com/rare-earth-magnet-producer-to-start-operations-in-stillwater/ ↩
Marx J, Schreiber A, Zapp P, Walachowicz F. “Environmental impacts of rare earth production.” PMC, 2022. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8929459/ ↩
Harvard International Review: “For every ton of rare earth produced, the mining process yields 13kg of dust, 9,600-12,000 cubic meters of waste gas, 75 cubic meters of wastewater, and one ton of radioactive residue.” https://hir.harvard.edu/not-so-green-technology-the-complicated-legacy-of-rare-earth-mining/ ↩
Ibid. ↩
Marx et al., PMC 2022. ↩
El Paso Matters: USA Rare Earth “said it has identified the air, water and waste permits it may need. Initial site work and surveys have shown ‘no indications of environmental concerns for advancing Round Top,’ the company said.” ↩
Farmonaut: “Annual contamination levels can reach up to 120 mg/L of heavy metals in adjacent rivers near mining sites (2025 estimates).” https://farmonaut.com/mining/environmental-impacts-of-rare-earth-mining-7-challenges ↩
Ibid: “These substances can: Leach into agricultural soils, reducing fertility and threatening food security. Contaminate water bodies, impairing local irrigation systems and drinking water sources.” ↩
USA Rare Earth corporate website: “Long-term, we intend to use the ore processed from this deposit in our magnet facility in Oklahoma.” https://www.usare.com/about ↩
Site Selection Magazine, 2022. ↩
USA Rare Earth January 26, 2026 press release: “Process 2,000 tpa of swarf resulting from our NdFeB magnet production.” https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2026/01/26/3225497/0/en/ ↩
El Paso Matters: UTEP Professor Goodell stated “It will be environmentally safe… Texas has good environmental laws.” ↩
SEC Filings:
USA Rare Earth Form 8-K (January 26, 2026): https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1970622/000121390025035605/ea0239572-8k_usarare.htm
USA Rare Earth Q3 2025 Form 10-Q: https://www.stocktitan.net/sec-filings/USAR/10-q-usa-rare-earth-inc-quarterly-earnings-report-27d713770772.html
Company Announcements:
USA Rare Earth Press Release (January 26, 2026) – Government Funding Letter of Intent: https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2026/01/26/3225497/0/en/USA-Rare-Earth-Announces-Letter-of-Intent-with-the-U-S-Government-for-Access-to-1-6-Billion-in-Funding-to-Accelerate-the-Domestic-Heavy-Rare-Earth-Value-Chain.html
USA Rare Earth Press Release (December 10, 2025) – Round Top Timeline Acceleration: https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2025/12/10/3203137/0/en/USA-Rare-Earth-Accelerates-Timeline-for-Round-Top-Deposit-Commercial-Production-by-Two-Years.html
USA Rare Earth Press Release (January 22, 2026) – Fluor and WSP Selection: https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2026/01/22/3223616/0/en/USA-Rare-Earth-Selects-Fluor-and-WSP-as-EPCM-Partners-to-Advance-Round-Top-Commercialization.html
USA Rare Earth Press Release (January 28, 2025) – Extraction Technology Breakthrough: https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2025/01/28/3016281/0/en/USA-Rare-Earth-Achieves-Breakthrough-in-Domestic-Rare-Earth-Production.html
USA Rare Earth Q2 2025 Financial Results: https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2025/08/11/3131221/0/en/USA-Rare-Earth-Reports-its-Second-Quarter-2025-Financial-Results.html
News Coverage:
CNBC (January 26, 2026) – Commerce Department Equity Stake: https://www.cnbc.com/2026/01/26/usa-rare-earth-shares-jump-20percent-as-commerce-department-takes-equity-stake.html
CNBC (January 24, 2026) – Trump Administration Deal Structure: https://www.cnbc.com/2026/01/24/us-rare-earths-miner.html
MarketScreener (January 26, 2026) – Funding Announcement: https://www.marketscreener.com/news/usa-rare-earth-shares-surge-on-1-6-billion-us-funding-proposal-ce7e5bdbda8cf120
Bloomberg/BNN (January 26, 2026) – Deal Analysis: https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/business/2026/01/26/usa-rare-earth-shares-surge-on-16-billion-us-funding-proposal/
MINING.COM (January 26, 2026) – Government Funding LOI: https://www.mining.com/usa-rare-earth-surges-on-1-6b-govt-funding-loi/
TradingView (January 26, 2026) – Trump Administration Deal: https://www.tradingview.com/news/invezz:fc27df1fd094b:0-usa-rare-earth-stock-surges-on-1-6b-trump-administration-deal/
The Northern Miner (Date N/A) – Commercial Output Plans: https://www.northernminer.com/news/usa-rare-earth-advances-commercial-output-plans/1003885545/
Futu News – Insider Stock Sales ($32.9M): https://news.futunn.com/en/post/60740064/usa-rare-earth-insider-sold-shares-worth-32946622-according-to
Industry Analysis:
Night Market Research Short Report (August 2025): https://nightmarketresearch.com/usar/
Rare Earth Exchanges – Separation Technology Challenges: https://rareearthexchanges.com/news/why-separating-and-refining-rare-earth-elements-is-so-difficult-to-scale/
Rare Earth Exchanges – USA Rare Earth Analysis: https://rareearthexchanges.com/news/usa-rare-earth-building-an-ex-china-magnet-chain-ambition-high-execution-still-the-test/
Company Information:
USA Rare Earth Corporate Website: https://www.usare.com/about
Stock Data:
TradingView Stock Chart (NASDAQ:USAR): https://www.tradingview.com/symbols/NASDAQ-USAR/
Previous Oklahoma Post Coverage:
“Stillwater’s Magnet USAR Facility Deal: Wall Street Wins, Oklahoma Loses” (May 16, 2025)
“While MP Materials Hits Jackpot, USAR Goes Broker Than Uncle Rico” (August 12, 2025)
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