USA Rare Earth and Lula: Brazil’s Vote and the Stillwater Bet

STILLWATER, Okla. — Oct. 29, 2026 (The Oklahoma Post)

Brazilian voters on Sunday handed Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva a fourth term, keeping in power the president who called the deal-making around his country’s only rare earth mine “a shame.” That mine, bought this summer by Stillwater-based USA Rare Earth with Washington’s money behind it, now sits inside his borders.

Lula beat Sen. Flávio Bolsonaro 51.8% to 48.2%, The Associated Press reported. The margin was about 4.4 million votes out of about 124 million valid votes. The next day, President Donald Trump told reporters, “I didn’t take sides, but it looked like another rigged election,” NPR reported. He offered no evidence.

The company’s most valuable operating asset is a mine called Pela Ema, in the town of Minaçu in the central Brazilian state of Goiás. For 15 years, a U.S. government-backed buyer has committed to take everything its first phase produces, at guaranteed minimum prices. Lula has said again and again that Brazil’s minerals belong to Brazil. Sunday’s vote decided that he will spend the next four years writing the rules over that mine.

This is the story of how a Stillwater magnet company, a Pentagon purchasing vehicle and a Brazilian clay deposit came to share one balance sheet, and of what the people who hold each piece can now do to the others.

The Vote

The result broke a 37-year pattern. Bolsonaro, the eldest son of former President Jair Bolsonaro, finished first in the opening round on Oct. 4. Since 1989, no Brazilian candidate who lost the first round had come back to win the runoff, NPR reported. Lula did.

Lula received about 64.2 million votes to Bolsonaro’s 59.8 million, Al Jazeera reported. In his victory speech, he called the result a “defeat of denialism. A defeat of lies,” and told Trump that Brazil would not accept being “anyone’s backyard.”

Bolsonaro did not concede. He called the result “inexplicable,” then “unacceptable,” and said he would seek to annul it, citing a two-hour extension of voting that Supreme Federal Court Justice Cristiano Zanin granted on petitions from both campaigns. In a later video, he said he would instead seek to have Lula’s win disqualified over alleged abuses of political and economic power, NPR reported. He offered no evidence. His own party did not follow him. Valdemar Costa Neto, president of Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party, said Monday that the party recognizes the result, while adding that “the issues raised need to be properly clarified.”

The same day, Bolsonaro said federal police had ordered him to surrender his passports and barred him from leaving the country. Justice Alexandre de Moraes issued the order in a separate investigation, NPR reported, after Bolsonaro’s brother Eduardo, who lives in the United States, suggested Flávio should leave Brazil if he lost.

Bolsonaro had run as Trump’s man. He campaigned on closer ties with Washington and pledged to pardon his father, who is serving a 27-year sentence under house arrest for plotting a coup, NPR reported. Experts told Reuters before the vote that a Bolsonaro government risked making concessions on strategic minerals. Monica de Bolle, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, said then that “there would be a lot of pressure on Lula to give in to some US demands regarding natural resources,” Reuters reported.

After the vote, she was more direct. “Revisiting the Serra Verde–USA Rare Earth deal may not be the first thing that Lula does when he’s reelected,” de Bolle told the AP. “It’s on his radar.” She added: “Brazil has leverage. With Lula, the U.S. is on shakier ground.”

Lula’s new term begins Jan. 5, 2027, The Northern Miner reported.

The Opposition Leaves the Country

Two days after Brazil voted, the candidate who ran on closer minerals ties with Washington was on U.S. soil.

Late Tuesday, Bolsonaro, his wife and two daughters crossed into Argentina. Within an hour they boarded a private plane bound for Guayaquil, Ecuador, Al Jazeera reported. The plane continued to Miami and landed at about 9:30 a.m. Wednesday at Miami-Opa Locka Executive Airport. He left the airport shielded by umbrellas, ABC News reported.

He had been told not to go. Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court had ordered him to surrender his regular and diplomatic passports to keep him in the country while he is investigated for embezzlement and money laundering, Al Jazeera reported. He is also under investigation in a sports betting case and in a probe into the production of a film about his father, ABC News reported. On Tuesday, Brazilian authorities said they did not know where he was.

As a senator, Bolsonaro has had immunity from criminal prosecution. He gave up his Senate seat to run for president, and he loses that immunity in January, Al Jazeera reported.

“I did not flee Brazil,” Bolsonaro said after landing, ABC News reported. The Washington Post reported that he declared himself Brazil’s true leader from Miami.

Washington was ready for him. A State Department official told ABC News the administration is issuing visas to Bolsonaro and his family. Two U.S. officials said the administration had been tracking his plans and expected him to try to leave Brazil for the United States. Trump called the Bolsonaros “fine people,” Al Jazeera reported. The two countries have an extradition treaty. Al Jazeera’s correspondent said the United States was not expected to send him back soon.

The route has been traveled before. After losing his own reelection bid in 2022, Jair Bolsonaro made a similar trip to Florida. He later returned to Brazil, where he is now under house arrest.

For the mine in Goiás, the flight settles one question. The man who would have offered Washington easier terms on Brazil’s minerals is no longer in a position to offer anything. Lula will write the council’s rules. His chief opponent will watch from Florida, a guest of the government whose purchasing vehicle holds the mine’s output.

The Town That Was Built by a Mine

Minaçu means “big mine” in Tupi-Guarani. The name was earned before anyone in Oklahoma had heard of it.

The Cana Brava asbestos deposit was found there in 1962. The company that worked it, SAMA, now part of Eternit, built the town’s first homes, roads, hospital, police station and school, Agência Pública reported in 2025. Residents called the company the town’s “mother.” Between 2010 and 2021, SAMA’s revenue was about four times the city’s own.

Then Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court banned asbestos in 2017. Goiás passed a law in 2019 allowing extraction for export only, a law still under review at the same court. In 2024, the state assembly set a five-year deadline to end asbestos mining altogether. About 27,000 people live in Minaçu. About 30% of its families now live in poverty, Agência Pública reported.

Serra Verde arrived as the town’s second act. It began commercial production at Pela Ema in January 2024, according to the company. The deposit is an ionic clay, the same kind of geology that made southern China the world’s source of heavy rare earths. Serra Verde calls itself the only scaled producer outside Asia of all four magnetic rare earths: neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium and terbium. Those elements go into the permanent magnets inside electric motors, wind turbines, guided missiles and fighter jets.

The mine’s ownership was never Brazilian. Before USA Rare Earth, Serra Verde was backed by two U.S. private equity funds, Denham Capital and The Energy & Minerals Group, and by the British fund Vision Blue Resources, Mining Technology reported.

Its customers were not Western either. In 2025, Serra Verde was extracting rare earths for export mainly to China, Agência Pública reported. While the mine was being built, it had signed 10-year agreements to sell concentrate to Chinese companies, because no one else could process it. In December 2025, Chief Executive Thras Moraitis said those deals had been renegotiated to end at the close of 2026, Reuters reported. Starting in the fourth quarter of 2026, all of the first phase’s output is contracted to the U.S. government-backed buyer. Any shipments still going to Chinese processors are the last of the old contracts, which expire Dec. 31.

The promised jobs came slowly. Agência Pública found that from October 2024 to March 2025, mining layoffs in Minaçu outpaced hiring every month, with at least 165 people dismissed. The mayor, Carlos Alberto Lereia, said he still expected the mine to bring “uma riqueza enorme,” enormous wealth. A 75-year-old former asbestos contractor, Raimundo Ferreira de Lima, told the reporters that for him the new mining was “a mesma coisa,” the same thing.

How Washington Bought In

The U.S. government reached Minaçu before USA Rare Earth did.

A U.S. International Development Finance Corporation document dated Aug. 15, 2025, showed the federal lender for projects abroad backing up to $465 million in upgrades at Pela Ema, Bloomberg reported. By the time the loan was signed in February 2026, it had grown 22% to $565 million, and it carried an option for Washington to take a minority stake in Serra Verde with no role in management, Reporte Minero reported, citing Chief Operating Officer Ricardo Grossi.

Goiás moved faster than Brasília. In August 2025, then-Gov. Ronaldo Caiado signed a state law creating a Goiás critical minerals authority, and in March 2026 the state signed a memorandum of understanding with the United States on mineral cooperation, Revista Fórum reported. The federal government objected. Under Brazil’s Constitution, the minerals under the ground belong to the Union, not the states, and foreign relations are a federal power.

Washington’s other hand was in Stillwater. On Jan. 26, 2026, the Commerce Department announced a letter of intent for a $1.6 billion package to USA Rare Earth. When the agreements were signed June 3, they included up to $277 million in direct funding, a federal guarantee on up to $1.3 billion in loans, 16,132,790 shares of USA Rare Earth stock and a warrant to buy 17,600,584 more at $17.17 a share, according to the company’s filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The administration described the arrangement as a stake of about 10%.

Then, on April 20, the two pieces met. USA Rare Earth announced it would buy Serra Verde for $300 million in cash and 126.8 million new shares, an implied value of about $2.8 billion based on the stock’s $19.95 closing price three days earlier, according to the announcement. The release projected Serra Verde would earn $550 million to $650 million a year before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization by the end of 2027.

The deal came with a buyer already attached. A special purpose vehicle, a company created to do one job, agreed to buy 100% of Pela Ema’s first-phase output for 15 years. On Aug. 24, USA Rare Earth said the vehicle was capitalized at $1.55 billion: $750 million from the Department of War, as the administration has renamed the Department of Defense; a bank commitment letter for a revolving credit line of up to $500 million; and a federal forward purchase contract for at least $300 million of product over five years, according to the company. The Pentagon’s share was $250 million more than first planned.

The deal closed Sept. 3.

The Floor Under the Price

The contract’s most important numbers are not in the purchase price. They are in the floor.

Serra Verde’s Aug. 24 announcement set guaranteed minimum prices for the four magnetic rare earths: $2,050 a kilogram for terbium, $575 for dysprosium and $110 each for neodymium and praseodymium, according to the release filed with the SEC. The company called them the industry’s first floors for the heavy rare earths, dysprosium and terbium.

The $110 figure has a history. In July 2025, the Pentagon guaranteed MP Materials, the operator of California’s Mountain Pass mine, the same $110-a-kilogram floor for neodymium-praseodymium oxide as part of a deal that also made the Defense Department that company’s largest shareholder. Washington has now written the same number twice, for two companies, in two countries.

A price floor is a promise that the taxpayer will make up the difference when the market pays less. It exists because China, which dominates the processing of these elements, can flood the market and drive Western producers out. China tightened that grip in April 2025, when it began requiring export licenses for seven medium and heavy rare earths, including dysprosium and terbium. The floor makes Pela Ema bankable. It also means the U.S. Treasury, not the market, sets the bottom of the mine’s revenue for the next 15 years.

The floor sits inside an agreement with the U.S. government. The mine sits inside Brazil.

Brazil Noticed

The sale landed in Brasília as an insult.

Two days after the April 20 announcement, Lula attacked Caiado, who had courted the Americans. “He made a deal with American companies, granting something he cannot grant, because it belongs to the Union,” Lula said, Brasil 247 reported. “If we’re not careful, these people will sell Brazil, and we can’t allow it.” He called the negotiation “uma vergonha,” a shame.

Caiado answered on a debate stage by accusing Lula of “selling Brazil,” Revista Fórum reported. Social media posts followed claiming Lula had personally sold the country’s only rare earth miner to the United States. The fact-checking agency Lupa rated the claim as missing context. The deal was between private companies, Lupa found, and the government’s communications office said it had been conducted “strictly within private contracts.” Both sides of Brazil’s election spent the spring blaming the other for a sale neither had the legal tool to stop.

That was the point. The tools did not exist.

The courts. On April 27, the Rede Sustentabilidade party asked Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court to intervene. Its petition, ADPF 1320, argued that the transactions could shift decision-making over a federal resource to a foreign group without any prior review of the national interest. It asked the court to require the Union and the National Mining Agency to turn over their analyses and to suspend the deal, according to the court. The case was assigned to Justice Nunes Marques. Federal deputies from the PSOL party separately asked the prosecutor general to annul the sale and investigate whether Caiado had exceeded his powers.

Lula’s own lawyers then argued against blocking it. On June 11, the Office of the Attorney General of the Union told the court there had been no qualified failure by the state to protect the public interest and recommended that it deny the request to suspend the change of control, Agência iNFRA reported. Nunes Marques granted no interim relief. The court took no action to stay the acquisition, and the deal closed Sept. 3.

The regulator. The National Mining Agency said it had no say. Its director-general, Mauro Sousa, said on May 15 that the deal did not need the agency’s approval, because it changed who owned the company, not who held the mining title, Portal Tela reported. The agency’s prior approval, he said, applies only when a title itself is transferred.

The antitrust authority. On May 11, the General Superintendence of CADE, Brazil’s competition regulator, opened a proceeding to determine whether the acquisition and the 15-year offtake amounted to a concentration act that should have been notified for review, MINING.COM reported. CADE said the proceeding “does not necessarily mean that the acts must be notified or that there are competition issues.” USA Rare Earth shares fell about 5% at midday after the news. CADE’s General Superintendence later closed the proceeding, finding that neither the acquisition nor the 15-year supply agreement was a reportable merger or an unlawful early closing under Brazil’s competition law.

So by summer, the record was this: the regulator said the deal was outside its reach, the antitrust authority opened a review and closed it without finding a violation, the government’s lawyers defended the sale in court, and the president called it a shame.

The Law That Arrived 13 Days Late

Congress was writing the missing tool the whole time.

The bill, PL 2780/2024, had been moving since 2024. Its author, Deputy Zé Silva, said the Serra Verde sale “motivated this debate to surface.” “What happened in Goiás was a warning,” he said, eixos reported.

The Senate passed it Sept. 2. USA Rare Earth closed on Serra Verde the next day.

Lula signed it Sept. 16 as Law No. 15,506/2026, the National Policy on Critical and Strategic Minerals, without vetoes, according to the law firm Cescon Barrieu. A decree the same day created the council the law requires: the National Council for the Industrialization of Critical and Strategic Minerals, known by its Portuguese initials, CIMCE. It reports to the Office of the President. Its plenary has 13 ministers and four outside members.

The law gives that council, jointly with the National Mining Agency, the power to approve four kinds of transactions involving holders of rights to critical or strategic minerals:

  • a direct or indirect change of corporate control, including through reorganizations;
  • access to strategic geological information, or material participation or significant influence by foreign companies;
  • international supply contracts, agreements or partnerships that may affect Brazil’s economic or geopolitical security;
  • the sale, assignment or encumbrance of federal mining titles.

The first category describes what happened at Serra Verde on Sept. 3. The law was published in the Diário Oficial da União on Sept. 17 and took effect that day, two weeks after the closing. It contains no clause reaching back to changes of control completed before publication. Brazil’s Constitution protects completed legal acts, and eixos called applying the new rules to a deal closed before the law existed “questionable.” Legal analysts say the council’s reach over earlier transactions will depend on regulations that have not been written.

The third category is different. The offtake is not a completed act. It is a 15-year supply relationship between a Brazilian mine and a U.S. government-backed buyer, with deliveries scheduled to begin in the fourth quarter of 2026. The law does not say whether a supply agreement signed before Sept. 16 must be reviewed when it is performed after. It does not say what happens if the council refuses. Lawmakers rejected an amendment that would have given the council 60 days to decide and deemed a transaction approved if it missed the deadline, Cescon Barrieu noted. The law sets no deadline at all.

The law also lets regulators require exporters to report the volume, destination and ultimate beneficiary of every shipment, and to set value-added requirements that favor processing in Brazil. Pela Ema exports a mixed rare earth carbonate, an intermediate product, to be separated and refined elsewhere.

The executive branch has up to 90 days to define the council’s structure and the “objective criteria” for national security review, according to Americas Market Intelligence. Counted from Sept. 16, that window closes in mid-December. Lula will write those rules as a president who just won a mandate running against the man who wanted to give Washington more.

At the signing, Lula did not mention Serra Verde by name. He did not need to. “As always, the traitors of the homeland, once again, fell on their knees before the United States,” he said, according to Acessa. “They promised to hand over our critical minerals and rare earths, in raw form, for next to nothing. We will not allow history to repeat itself.” He closed: “Let Brazil’s enemies understand once and for all: our sovereignty is not for sale.”

Lawyers who advise investors are measuring their words. Adriano Drummond Trindade, a partner at Mattos Filho, said investors are concerned mainly with implementation, and that Lula’s reelection “shall not adversely affect investment in mining” if the rules are applied with predictability, consistency and timeliness, The Northern Miner reported. Roberta Demange, a lawyer at Pinheiro Neto, told Folha de S.Paulo that the law creates mandatory costs and uncertainty about which transactions need council approval, Newsweek reported.

What Stillwater Was Promised

The view from Airport Road is narrower and older.

In June 2022, state officials announced that USA Rare Earth would put a $100 million magnet factory in Stillwater, with 100 jobs and production slated to begin in 2023, KOSU reported. “Oklahoma has long been on the cutting edge of energy innovation,” Gov. Kevin Stitt said. “We’re competing hard for every single project.”

The Stillwater Economic Development Authority approved $7 million to repair and renovate the vacant former Total Energy building at 100 W. Airport Road for the plant, CNHI News Oklahoma reported. The city took a first lien on the building, so that if the company failed, Stillwater would keep the improved property. The company said it would eventually employ at least 100 people at a median wage of about $60,000. The report did not describe any enforceable job requirement.

The state added $1.2 million from its Quick Action Closing Fund in fiscal 2023. The fund’s report lists the payee as “USA Rare Metals, LLC,” according to the Oklahoma Department of Commerce. The grant went to the company’s operating entity, USA Rare Earth, LLC. It requires 100 full-time jobs in Stillwater at an average annual wage of $60,000, maintained over a five-year performance window, with clawbacks if employment falls below the baseline. Unlike the city’s deal, the state’s has teeth. The Post reported in February that Oklahoma’s support for the company totaled $8.2 million.

Production did not begin in 2023. It did not begin in 2024 or 2025. On March 26, 2026, USA Rare Earth announced it had commissioned its first commercial magnet line in Stillwater, which it called Phase 1a, with customer orders to begin shipping in the second quarter, MINING.COM reported. More than 100 people worked at the plant. The company said output would reach a run rate of about 600 metric tons a year by the end of 2026 and, with a second line, 1,200 tons by early 2027.

The jobs promise, in other words, has been met. The schedule was missed by three years.

The Move to South Carolina

The plant that will make most of the company’s magnets is not in Oklahoma.

On June 3, the same day it signed the Commerce agreements, USA Rare Earth announced a $1.2 billion plant at Bailey Industrial Park in Blacksburg, in Cherokee County, S.C., Mining Technology reported. It is designed to make 6,400 tons of sintered magnets a year and 5,000 tons of strip-cast metals and alloys, with about 490 jobs. Commissioning is planned for 2028.

Set the two plants side by side and the company’s priorities read plainly:

Stillwater, Okla.Blacksburg, S.C.
AnnouncedJune 2022June 2026
Promised production20232028
Magnet capacity600 tons by end of 2026; 1,200 tons by early 20276,400 tons a year
JobsMore than 100About 490
Investment$100 million announced$1.2 billion

At full build, Blacksburg would make more than five times the magnets Stillwater is planned to make.

The company said it chose South Carolina after comparing several states. It cited grants, tax incentives, affordable power, a skilled workforce and proximity to defense and aerospace customers. Then-Chief Executive Barbara Humpton said the state offered the workforce, infrastructure and partners that let the company “move quickly.”

The company describes Blacksburg as a complement to Stillwater, not a replacement. With planned Stillwater expansions, it says the two sites together target 10,000 tons a year each of magnets and of heavy rare earth strip-cast metals and alloys, Mining Technology reported. The company has not said how much of that capacity will be in Oklahoma.

The federal money follows the same map, at least on paper. The SEC filing shows how the Commerce package is divided. None of it is paid until the company hits project milestones:

ProjectDirect fundingGuaranteed loans
Stillwater magnet plant$50 million$250 million
Stillwater metal plant$20 million$100 million
Second magnet project$60 million$325 million
Round Top, Hudspeth County, Texas$132 million$550 million

The filing does not name the site of the second magnet project. The company announced Blacksburg the same day it signed the agreements.

Oklahoma paid first, with a city building, a state closing-fund grant and a governor’s welcome. The bigger plant went east.

The Ore and the Oven

There is a gap between a mine in Goiás and a magnet in Stillwater, and it is not measured in miles.

Pela Ema produces a mixed rare earth carbonate, Serra Verde said in August. A sintered magnet requires separated, refined oxides turned into metal and alloy before it ever reaches a press. Those middle steps, separation and metal-making, are where China’s control is tightest. In December 2025, Moraitis said he expected options to separate heavy rare earths outside China “in a couple of years,” Reuters reported.

USA Rare Earth’s October investor presentation listed a processing circuit tailored to Serra Verde’s material as still under technical development, Newsweek reported. It projected first magnet sales by year-end. In May, the Energy Department selected the company for up to $19.3 million toward a pilot-scale rare earth separations project worth about $50.5 million in total, MINING.COM reported. The award remained subject to final negotiation. A pilot is a test, not a plant.

The contract, meanwhile, sends 100% of the first phase’s output to the government-backed vehicle, not to the Stillwater plant. Public filings do not say how much Serra Verde material, if any, will reach Oklahoma. The company says it holds memorandums and letters of intent from customers covering 2,500 tons of magnets a year, Trefis reported. That is roughly double the capacity Stillwater expects to have by early 2027. For now, the Phase 1a line in Stillwater runs on heavy rare earth oxides bought from third-party suppliers.

The company has said the mine-to-magnet chain will run through Round Top. Production there is targeted for late 2028, MINING.COM reported in March, and a definitive feasibility study is due to be published in the first quarter of 2027, according to the company’s second-quarter results.

The Money at USA Rare Earth

The market has already rendered a verdict on the year.

USA Rare Earth stock closed at $10.40 on Oct. 27, up from $8.91 the day before. It traded at $10.84 at midday Thursday, down 22.7% over the past month, with a market value of about $4.06 billion, according to Nasdaq real-time prices displayed by Yahoo Finance. It is down 55.9% over the past year, Trefis reported.

Wall Street cannot agree on what it is looking at. On Oct. 26, the day after Brazil voted, CNBC headlined Jim Cramer’s “Lightning Round” segment “Don’t touch USA Rare Earth.” The same day, Texas Capital started coverage with a buy rating and a $22 price target, calling the company “well-aligned with domestic onshoring tailwinds,” Seeking Alpha reported. That target is about double Thursday’s price.

A market value of $4.06 billion at $10.84 implies about 375 million shares outstanding. Against that count, the government’s 16.1 million shares are about 4% of the company. The administration announced its stake in January as about 10%. Since then, the company has issued 69.8 million shares to private investors and 126.8 million to Serra Verde’s owners. Each comparison point from 2026 now sits underwater:

  • Private investors. On Jan. 28, a $1.5 billion private placement sold 69,767,442 shares at $21.50, the SEC filing shows. At $10.40, those shares have lost about 52% of their value.
  • Serra Verde’s former owners. They took 126.8 million shares, valued in April at $19.95 each. At $10.40, that stock is worth about $1.32 billion, not the $2.53 billion it was worth when the deal was announced. Including the $300 million in cash, the $2.8 billion deal is worth about $1.6 billion at Tuesday’s price.
  • Taxpayers. The government’s 16.1 million shares are worth about $168 million at $10.40. Its warrant lets it buy 17.6 million more at $17.17, about 65% above Tuesday’s close. A warrant priced above the stock is worth exercising only if the stock climbs back.

The company is losing money on what it sells. Gross margin was negative 27.2% in the second quarter, meaning its products cost more to make than they brought in, Trefis reported. Revenue for the quarter was $5.8 million, against an operating loss of $46.3 million, the company reported. It held about $1.53 billion in cash at the end of June, before it paid for Serra Verde. Capital spending in the first half of 2026 was $108.4 million, up from $6.3 million a year earlier.

The Commerce agreement also requires the company to keep raising money: $375 million plus Serra Verde’s cash acquisition costs by March 31, 2027, and $875 million by the end of 2027, according to the SEC filing. Every new share sold at today’s price dilutes the government’s stake, and everyone else’s.

USA Rare Earth reports third-quarter results Nov. 5, two days after the U.S. midterm elections. It will be the first report to include Serra Verde.

Where the Money Went

The money in this story has moved. It has not moved to Stillwater.

As of the end of June, USA Rare Earth had met none of the Commerce Department’s milestones and had received no loan money, Bloomberg Businessweek reported in September, citing public filings. The $277 million in direct funding and the $1.3 billion in guaranteed loans are paid only as the company completes feasibility studies, builds facilities, installs equipment and reaches production targets. A company spokesperson told Bloomberg the government has already received its shares and warrants.

The money that did move ran through Wall Street. Commerce made a private placement a condition of finalizing its deal, Rep. Zoe Lofgren of California, the ranking Democrat on the House Science Committee, wrote in March, citing the company’s disclosures to the SEC. On Jan. 28, that placement raised $1.5 billion at $21.50 a share.

Cantor Fitzgerald ran it. Cantor’s bankers collected about $50 million in fees, Bloomberg reported. Cantor is the firm Howard Lutnick led for decades before he became commerce secretary. Under his ethics agreement, he transferred his stake to his two adult sons, who now run it. Brandon Lutnick is the firm’s chairman.

The secretary whose department wrote the deal is the father of the men whose firm was paid to raise the money the deal required.

Democrats said so in writing. On Feb. 26, Sens. Elizabeth Warren, Ron Wyden and Chris Van Hollen told Lutnick the arrangement “could stand to enrich your immediate family and former company,” according to Warren’s office. Their letter said billionaire Trump donors Steve Schwarzman, Ken Griffin and Steven A. Cohen reportedly had access to shares in the Cantor-brokered placement. Lofgren wrote that the deal gives the government “an extraordinary and even bizarre degree of leverage” over a private company, and that Commerce would keep its full equity stake even if the government later backed out, according to her office. In July, Democrats wrote to Brandon Lutnick asking about Cantor’s role, fees and communications, The Daily Beast reported, citing The Wall Street Journal.

Lutnick denies any conflict. Asked on CNBC’s “Squawk Box” on Sept. 2 whether the arrangement was one, he said, “It’s just not.” “My kids bought my company, so I am no longer involved in my old company at all,” he said, adding, “This is minor stuff, anyway,” according to a transcript summary of the interview. Commerce has said Lutnick and the department had no discussions with Cantor about rare earths, and Cantor has said it had no role in the government negotiations, Bloomberg reported.

None of the letters has established wrongdoing. They have established the shape of the transaction:

  • Cantor Fitzgerald: about $50 million in fees, paid in 2026.
  • Serra Verde’s former owners: $300 million in cash and 126.8 million shares, paid at closing.
  • The U.S. government: 16.1 million shares and a warrant, delivered.
  • Stillwater: a $7 million city renovation deal from 2022, a $1.2 million state grant from fiscal 2023 and federal funds that are earmarked but, as of June, unpaid.

The fees have been paid. As of June, by the company’s own filings, the plant in Stillwater had not received a dollar of the federal milestone money.

The Sellers Now Run the Buyer

There is a quieter shift in who runs the company.

On July 20, USA Rare Earth announced that Chief Executive Barbara Humpton would retire Oct. 1 and that Moraitis, Serra Verde’s chief executive since January 2023, would replace her, according to the company. Michael Blitzer was elected executive chairman. At closing, Serra Verde’s chairman, Sir Mick Davis, joined the board.

Moraitis is a mining dealmaker. He was a senior executive at Xstrata and co-founded the mining investment fund X2 Resources, and he advises Vision Blue Resources, one of Serra Verde’s former owners, according to the company’s release. The executive who negotiated the sale of the Brazilian mine now runs the Oklahoma company that bought it. Serra Verde’s former shareholders, including Denham Capital, The Energy & Minerals Group and Vision Blue Resources, held 33.8% of the combined company immediately after the Sept. 3 closing, according to the definitive proxy statement filed for the deal. Together they own about eight times what Washington does.

“Our focus now turns to execution, integrating operations, and moving efficiently toward steady-state and reliable supply,” Blitzer said when the deal closed.

The headquarters is still listed in Stillwater. The company’s gravity is now in Goiás.

What Each Side Holds

Strip away the speeches and three parties are left holding three different kinds of power.

Washington holds money and paper. It has 16.1 million shares of USA Rare Earth, announced as a stake of about 10% and now closer to 4%, a warrant, a $565 million loan to the mine, $750 million in the purchasing vehicle and a 15-year contract with guaranteed floor prices. It has no title to the ground. It has a president who called Brazil’s election rigged the day after it ended, a State Department that issued visas to the defeated candidate after he left Brazil despite a court order barring him from leaving, and tariffs on Brazilian goods that both governments set up a working group in September to negotiate, Reuters reported.

Brasília holds the ground. Under Brazil’s Constitution, the mineral resources belong to the Union, regardless of who owns the company that mines them. It now has a law that requires the council’s approval for changes of control and for international supply agreements that touch national security, a council that answers to the president, and up to 90 days from Sept. 16 to write the criteria. It has a pending Supreme Federal Court case and a president who has called the people who would hand over these minerals “traitors.”

Brasília also needs what Washington is offering. The same law tries to build a Brazilian processing industry with tax credits of up to 20% of eligible spending, capped at 1 billion reais a year from 2030 through 2034, and a guarantee fund of up to 2 billion reais from the federal government. “We do not want to be an exporter of raw materials,” Development Minister Márcio Elias Rosa said this spring, Revista Fórum reported. Juan Ignacio Guzmán, chief executive of GEM Mining Consulting, told The Northern Miner that Brazil is “currently viewed as a strategic partner of the United States in the global race for critical minerals,” and that he does not expect major repercussions from the political split between Lula and Trump.

Stillwater holds the address. It has a plant that started three years late, more than 100 jobs, a building with a city lien on it, and a corporate parent whose most valuable asset and largest planned factory are in other places. It holds no vote in any of the decisions that will set the mine’s future: not in the council, not on the Supreme Federal Court, not in the Pentagon’s purchasing vehicle.

The Failure Point

The pattern in this story is not a single bad decision. It is a chain of controls that each looked to the next for the answer.

In Brazil, the mining agency said a change of ownership was not its business. The antitrust authority asked whether the deal was a merger. The government’s lawyers told the court the state had not failed to act. The law that would have required a review arrived 13 days after closing. Every barrier existed somewhere in the system. None stood in the path of this deal at the moment it closed.

In the United States, the barriers ran the other way. Washington wanted the mine outside China’s reach so badly that it financed the mine, financed the buyer, guaranteed the price and bought a piece of the company. Its leverage is real, and it has been used. What it does not have is control over the country where the ore is.

In Oklahoma, the protections were smaller and local: a lien on a building and incentives paid on performance. They have held. They were not built to answer the question now in front of the company, which is what happens to a Stillwater magnet business when its future depends on rules written in Brasília.

What Comes Next

The calendar now runs on three clocks.

On Nov. 3, Americans vote in the midterms. On Nov. 5, USA Rare Earth reports its first quarter with Serra Verde on the books. By mid-December, the 90-day window to write the council’s review criteria closes. On Jan. 5, Lula begins his fourth term.

Inside those dates, the first deliveries of mixed rare earth carbonate, scheduled to begin early in the fourth quarter, move from Goiás to a buyer funded by the U.S. Department of War, under a 15-year contract signed before Brazil’s law existed and performed after it.

Neither government has said what it intends to do with what it holds. Both have said a great deal about what they believe they are owed. Leverage belongs to whoever needs the other less, and the mine does not move.

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EDITOR’S NOTE:


Sources

The election

Vote shares and de Bolle’s post-election remarks: The Associated Press via WPVI, “Lula’s win in Brazil bucks a regional shift to the right and denies Trump a powerful ally”

First-round history, Lula’s victory speech and Bolsonaro’s campaign: NPR via WUNC, “Brazil’s left-wing President Lula elected for fourth term”

Trump’s remarks, Bolsonaro’s refusal to concede and the passport order: NPR via KUOW

Vote totals and the Liberal Party statement: Al Jazeera

Pre-election minerals stakes and the U.S.-Brazil tariff working group: Reuters, “Brazil election to reshape trade with US, with tariffs and minerals at stake”

Inauguration date and investor reaction: The Northern Miner, “Lula’s Brazil win puts rare earths in Trump’s crosshairs”

Minaçu and the mine

Town history, poverty and mining employment: Agência Pública, “Do amianto às terras raras”

Production start and prior backers: Mining Technology

Chinese offtake agreements: Reuters via Kitco, “Serra Verde cuts short China offtake deals”

The deal and its financing

DFC approval: Bloomberg Law

DFC loan signing and the equity option: Reporte Minero

Commerce agreements, PIPE and equity-raise requirements: USA Rare Earth Form 8-K, June 3, 2026, via StockTitan

Acquisition terms: USA Rare Earth announcement, April 20, 2026, SEC Exhibit 99.1

Purchasing vehicle capitalization: USA Rare Earth release, Aug. 24, 2026

Floor prices and product type: Serra Verde release, Aug. 24, 2026, SEC Exhibit 99.2

Closing, board changes and production targets: USA Rare Earth release, Sept. 4, 2026, SEC Exhibit 99.1

Brazil’s response

Lula’s April remarks: Brasil 247

Caiado, the Goiás law and memorandum: Revista Fórum

Fact-check and the government’s position: Agência Lupa

ADPF 1320: Supreme Federal Court

Attorney general’s position: Agência iNFRA

National Mining Agency position: Portal Tela

CADE proceeding: MINING.COM

The law

Law No. 15,506/2026 provisions and council structure: Cescon Barrieu

Regulation window and investor risk: Americas Market Intelligence

Closing before the law and Zé Silva’s remarks: eixos

Lula’s signing remarks: Acessa

Pinheiro Neto analysis and the UOL report: Newsweek, “Trump already has a victory in Lula’s Brazil”

Stillwater

2022 announcement: KOSU

City incentive: CNHI News Oklahoma via Enid News & Eagle

Quick Action Closing Fund payments: Oklahoma Department of Commerce

Phase 1a commissioning: MINING.COM

South Carolina plant: Mining Technology

Second-quarter results and guidance: USA Rare Earth, SEC Exhibit 99.1

Former Serra Verde holders’ ownership: USA Rare Earth definitive proxy statement for the Serra Verde combination

Leadership transition: USA Rare Earth release, July 20, 2026

Thursday price, monthly change and market value: Nasdaq real-time prices via Yahoo Finance, Oct. 29, 2026, noon CT

Cramer segment: CNBC, “Lightning Round: Don’t touch USA Rare Earth, says Jim Cramer,” Oct. 26, 2026

Texas Capital initiation, Oct. 26, 2026: Seeking Alpha, “USA Rare Earth started Buy at Texas Capital as ‘well-aligned with domestic onshoring tailwinds'”

DOE separations award: MINING.COM, “USA Rare Earth wins up to $19.3M in DOE backing”

Stock performance, gross margin and customer letters of intent: Trefis

Previous Oklahoma Post coverage

$8.2 Million From Oklahoma, $277 Million From Feds, Zero Dollars in Revenue: The USA Rare Earth Math Problem

USA Rare Earth Buys Out Minority Partner for $73 Million While Stillwater Waits for Jobs

USA Rare Earth’s Commissioning Announcement May Have a Fire Code Problem

USA Rare Earth Filed Something Interesting With the SEC the Day After Its Big Announcement

Governor’s Fund award and Quality Jobs Program: USA Rare Earth prospectus and supplement, SEC EDGAR

Current council and SEDA membership: City of Stillwater


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